

APPROPRIATION OF LANGUAGE

SOME VALUE-TERMS  
IN THE ORATORY OF AESCHINES

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY**  
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## Foreword to proceeding IHL

István Hahn (1913–1984) was former head of the Department of Ancient History at ELTE (1963–1983), full member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and an internationally acknowledged expert of several areas of ancient history. He graduated from our university in 1935 as a teacher of Latin, ancient Greek, and history, whereas in 1937 he received a degree in the College of Rabbinical Studies. Besides classical languages, he was perfect in Hebrew, Aramaic, Syrian, and Arabic, and he became a scholar not only of Greek and Roman political, economic and religious history but also of the ancient and medieval history of the Jews.

His twenty years as head of our Department laid down the course of its later history and turned it into an internationally acclaimed research centre. To commemorate his scientific accomplishment, the Department of Ancient History at ELTE and the Non Omnis Moriar Foundation decided to honour a scholar gaining international fame in any of the scientific areas studied by István Hahn with the title *István Hahn Lecturer* in every second year (even years). The honoured scholar holds an inaugural lecture in our Department and publishes the lecture as a small monograph in the István Hahn Lecturers (*IHL*) series.

Likewise in every two years (odd years), we honour promising scientists less than 45 years old with the reward *István Hahn Prize* of the Non Omnis Moriar Foundation, which can be freely spent on their research, though they are also expected to publish their results in separate volumes of the *IHL*.

*Prof. Dr. György Németh*  
*Head of Department*

**Professors honoured with the title  
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2008: *Thomas Köves-Zulauf (Marburg)*

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2016: *Dániel Bajnok (Eger)*

2018: *Gyula Lindner (Pécs)*



## 1. Introduction

The title of this booklet was inspired by an article in the *Classical Philology* by Matthew R. Christ, which highlighted “Demosthenes’ appropriation of philanthrōpia as a democratic virtue.” As diachronic analysis revealed, φιλανθρωπία had originally been a term mainly used in philosophical and theological contexts, and it was applied to divinities doing favours to mankind or to certain individuals (φίλος, ἄνθρωπος), and later, mostly in historical and rhetorical sources, to rulers and aristocrats showing a generous and friendly attitude towards people. Christ clearly demonstrated the democratization of the concept of φιλανθρωπία, i.e. Demosthenes’ conscious and consistent efforts to turn the traditional, aristocratic, and relatively rarely used notion into an important value-term of contemporary democratic discourse and an attribute of the demos: “Demosthenes is consciously appropriating as a democratic virtue a positive attribute that conservatives associated with elite individuals.” As a palpable consequence, Demosthenes ceased to call rulers (e.g. Philip II of Macedon) a φιλόανθρωπος person, unless satirically.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> All citations in this paragraph are from Christ 2013, 205–207. For an exhaustive evolutionary analysis of the term φιλανθρωπία, see Sulek 2010.

No matter how thorough his investigation of Demosthenes' political theory, Christ overlooked an important passage of Aeschines, the main political opponent of Demosthenes in the 340s and 330s BC. This text indicates that Aeschines was fully aware of Demosthenes' endeavour to monopolize certain elements of language, φιλανθρωπία among others, in order to achieve political success. In the concluding section of his speech *Against Ctesiphon* (330 BC), Aeschines tried to predict the consequences of honouring Demosthenes with a golden crown, explaining to the Athenian audience that in this case other Greeks shall judge their city on the basis of the repulsive and cowardly behaviour of Demosthenes. At this point, after posing a rhetorical question, Aeschines revealed his awareness of his rival's appropriation of language:

*How, then, could this disgrace be avoided? If you are suspicious of people **who appropriate for themselves the language of equality and generosity** but whose character is suspect. The terms "loyalty" and "commitment to democracy" are open to all, but in general the people who are quickest to resort to them in argument are the ones furthest removed from them in their conduct.<sup>2</sup>*

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<sup>2</sup> Aeschn. 3.247–248: Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις τὴν τοιαύτην αἰσχύνην ἐκφύγοι; ἔαν **τοὺς προκαταλαμβάνοντας τὰ κοινὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα τῶν ὀνομάτων**, ἀπίστους ὄντας τοῖς ἡθεσι, φυλάξησθε. Ἡ γὰρ εὐνοία καὶ τὸ

As we can see, Aeschines claimed that his opponent intended to preoccupy (προκαταλαμβάνειν) phrases that are κοινός and φιλόανθρωπος, but terms like εὐνοια or the name of democracy cannot be used exclusively, and those who reiterate them in their speech (τῷ λόγῳ) are in fact far away from the values conveyed by these words in their actions (τοῖς ἔργοις).<sup>3</sup> Aeschines suggested that the inclination to appropriate certain phrases is yet another character flaw of Demosthenes, implying that Aeschines himself was free from the same weakness. Abstract terms used in a particular sense have long been identified and studied in the speeches of Demosthenes,<sup>4</sup> but relatively little effort has been made either to reveal the value terminology and slogans that were used by Aeschines to bolster his own political aims, or to investigate the means he

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τῆς δημοκρατίας ὄνομα κεῖται μὲν ἐν μέσῳ, φθάνουσι δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ καταφεύγοντες τῷ λόγῳ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ τοῖς ἔργοις πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντες. Texts from Aeschines are cited in the translation of Christopher Carey (with modifications, if necessary), see Carey 2000. The Greek text is from Dilts 1997. Greek authors, works, and various sources are abbreviated according to *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* (Montanari 2015, x–lv).

<sup>3</sup> Aeschines' remonstrance against the appropriation by Demosthenes was highlighted also by Cook 2009, 39.

<sup>4</sup> The literature on abstract terms used by Demosthenes is vast, for a general overview see e.g. the commentaries on the *Kranzrede* (Demosth. 18) by Wankel 1976 and by Yunis 2001.

utilized rhetorical metaphors in an attempt to frame<sup>5</sup> his opponent as a repulsive politician.<sup>6</sup> What are the phrases in the lexicon of Aeschines that he applied to establish a moral and political agenda for Athens and how does he set his adversaries in context of these values? Did he ever attempt to monopolize such value-terms in the way Demosthenes did with e.g. φιλανθρωπία? What was the reaction of Demosthenes, if any? This study intends to find answers to these questions.

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<sup>5</sup> Framing “is the process whereby communicators act – consciously or not – to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more or less noticeable (even ignored) than others.” (Kuypers 2009, 182.) Effective rhetorical frames are usually invoked through metaphoric language, a field studied by cognitive linguistics, see Lakoff–Johnson 2003, Kövecses 2006. For a concise overview of the topic, see Müller 2008, 2–14.

<sup>6</sup> For a remarkable and thought-provoking exception, see Cook 2012, esp. 230–238.

## 2. Research methods

Concerning research methodology, the value-terms investigated in this study are greatly specified by quantitative means. Modern computer databases enable researchers to select various corpora, to determine their size, to search them, or to compare and contrast them according to specific criteria. If we consider the political oeuvre of Aeschines, we can take his three surviving orations into account (Aeschn. 1–3), which form a perfectly definable body of texts.<sup>7</sup> This selection of texts is in strong interaction with the corpus of Demosth. 18–19. The content relationship of the collections is obvious. Demosthenes and Aeschines first confronted each other in the trial against Timarchus in 346/5, and a considerable part of Aeschines' indictment (Aeschn. 1) is targeted on Demosthenes, who supported the main defendant, though his speech did not survive.<sup>8</sup> The other speeches mentioned are the main orations delivered against each other in the great courtroom trials on the Embassy (343, Demosth. 19 vs. Aeschn. 2) and on the Crown (330, Aeschn. 3 vs. Demosth. 18). These are all available in the database of the *Perseus Digital*

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<sup>7</sup> There are twelve letters of Aeschines in the manuscript tradition, but they are all agreed to be spurious, see Ruiz-Muñoz 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Fisher 2001, 23–24.

*Library* (hence: Perseus) and in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG).<sup>9</sup>

### 2.1. CALIBRATING CORPORA

The selected corpora of public speeches, however, are not instantly ready for relevant frequency analysis, since they may contain various documents: citations of laws or decrees, excerpts from poetry, letters, witness testimonies, etc. The first principal issue with these documents is that they were not written by the orator. This is not necessarily a serious problem if the documents serve as genuine tools of persuasion embedded into the speech according to the author's intention. For example, if the orator decided to cite a piece of poetry in order to support his arguments (as e.g. Aeschn. 1.148 or Demosth. 19.255), then the lexical and semantic elements of the quotation are valid components of the Aeschinean or Demosthenic corpus that we are to study, even though the original author of the passages (Homer, Solon, etc.) is different from the speaker. The real problem emerges if the documents are later forgeries added to the texts. In the case of Demosthenes, his speech on the Embassy contains numerous references to laws, decrees, testimonies, and letters that were read out by

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<sup>9</sup> Perseus is available at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>. The TLG version used for this research was CD ROM #E, and the search engine was *Diogenes* by Peter Heslin.

the γραμματεὺς of the court at the request of the speaker.<sup>10</sup> However, the surviving text of Demosth. 19 does not include the actual laws, decrees, etc., because these were probably not copied into the published version of Demosthenes' oration. The situation is entirely different with Demosth. 18, where we find a lot of actual documentary evidence, but all of them are considered spurious.<sup>11</sup> In the case of Aeschines, we can discover ample references to documents read out during the trial, but only the speech against Timarchus contains actual texts of documents (until chapter 68), and it was easy to disprove their authenticity.<sup>12</sup> Drawing these forgeries into our investigation would tamper the results not only in the exact size of the corpora, but also in the frequency analysis of terms.

Therefore it is necessary to calibrate our results by discarding all textual elements from the collections that are not genuine constituents of the orations. Since this is not a feature either in Perseus or in TLG (Diogenes), we need to remove spurious documents, reference words like νόμος, ψήφισμα, μαρτυρία, etc., and even chapter numbers manually from the selection. This will modify the size of the clusters significantly, however, the resulting calibrated data

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<sup>10</sup> [Aristot.] *Ath.* 67.3.

<sup>11</sup> Canevaro 2013, 237–239.

<sup>12</sup> Drerup 1898, 305–308, Fisher 2001, 68.

reflects the true characteristics of the author's text that is free from external and subsequent layers. The following table shows the size of each relevant collection according to *The Perseus Catalog* and also the size determined on the basis of the above described calibration.

Corpus	Word count (Perseus) <sup>13</sup>	Word count (calibrated)
Aeschn. 1	13 961	13 102
Aeschn. 2	12 758	12 332
Aeschn. 3	19 171	18 488
<i>Aeschn. 1–3</i> (=ΣAesch)	45 890	43 922
Demosth. 18	22 893	19 572
Demosth. 19	23 576	23 134
<i>Demosth. 18–19</i> (=ΣDem)	46 469	42 706

*Table 1. Word count of corpora.*

As we can see, the difference in the number of words between raw data and calibrated results in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%. The same difference in ΣAesch is 1968 words (4.5%), which is due to a smaller number of

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<sup>13</sup> For the word count of Aeschines' speeches according to *The Perseus Catalog*, see <http://catalog.perseus.org/catalog/urn:cite:perseus:author.31>; for Demosthenes, see <http://catalog.perseus.org/catalog/urn:cite:perseus:author.466>.



spurious documents embedded into the text of Aeschines. By the same token, the size of the calibrated Aeschinean corpus differs only slightly (2.8%) from the size of the two Demosthenic orations delivered against Aeschines (Demosth. 18–19), therefore it seems reasonable to compare the frequency of terms in Aeschines' language to that of Demosthenes.

More importantly, using calibrated corpora exonerates the research from some difficult or even ultimately insoluble questions. What was the actual length of public trials at Athens? Is there any difference between the text we have and the text of the speech actually performed at court? Were there any major revisions, or only tiny emendations to oratorical texts? When and how did orators publish their speeches, if at all?<sup>14</sup> These intriguing problems become irrelevant if we analyse terminology in calibrated corpora. The surviving text that we have may be neither historically accurate nor identical with the performed variant, but it will be a truthful reflection of the speaker's political aims and terminology, or in other words, "the underlying significance of his predicament."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> For the problem of revision before publication, see the radical views of Worthington 1991, and a more sceptical stance of Harris 1995, 9–11 (for Aeschines), and MacDowell 2009, 7–8 (for Demosthenes).

<sup>15</sup> Hubbard 2008, 187.

## 2.2. FREQUENCY OF TERMS

*Perseus* also provides us with exact figures based on the extant works of other orators in classical Athens. Since ancient literary criticism established the canon of the Ten Attic Orators (including Aeschines),<sup>16</sup> it is useful to correlate the frequency of selected terms in  $\Sigma$ Aesch or in  $\Sigma$ Dem with the frequency of the same term in the entire corpus of orators in order that we can see if a given phrase is used more or less often than others. As frequency of terms is measured on the basis of word count, we need to summarize the words of orators, which makes (according to the *Perseus* Greek Vocabulary Tool) altogether 637004 words.<sup>17</sup> This word count is based on all surviving speeches of orators (Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Demosthenes,<sup>18</sup> Dinarchus, Hyperides,<sup>19</sup> Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Lysias), including the letters

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<sup>16</sup> For the composition of the canon of the Ten Attic Orators, see Roisman–Worthington 2015, 6–10.

<sup>17</sup> Total word count of orators is generated by selecting every corpus of individual orators at Greek Vocabulary Tool (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/vocablist>).

<sup>18</sup> The Corpus Demosthenicum obviously includes works of other authors as well, e.g. Apollodorus.

<sup>19</sup> As for the new fragments of Hyperides' *Against Diondas* and *Against Timandrus* (320 lines, i.e. about 2400 words), these texts have not been imported by *Perseus*, and obviously TLG CD ROM #E does not contain these, either; therefore they were not taken into consideration. For the new Hyperides fragments, see Horváth 2014.

of Isocrates, and the prologues and letters of Demosthenes.

	Aeschn. 1	Aeschn. 2	Aeschn. 3	ΣAesch	Dem. 19	Dem. 18	ΣDem
φιланθρωπία	1	4	0	5	2	5	7
φιλέανθρωπος	1	1	2	4	7	3	10
φιλανθρωπεύομαι	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	2	5	2	9	10	8	18

*Table 2. The frequency of φιλανθρωπία and its cognates.*

Establishing the size of three basic corpora (ΣAesch [calibrated], ΣDem [calibrated], and the total collection of Attic orators) enables us to determine the absolute frequency of any term within the selection simply by dividing the word count of the relevant corpus by the number of occurrences of the investigated term.<sup>20</sup> E.g. the absolute frequency of the above mentioned φιλανθρωπία and its cognates<sup>21</sup> in ΣAesch is 4880, because these phrases occur 9 times in

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<sup>20</sup> This is called relative frequency by the Perseus Vocabulary Tool Help (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/help/vocab>), which interpretation is not followed here.

<sup>21</sup> Including all inflected nominal, verbal, adjectival and adverbial forms of the term, with comparatives and superlatives.

43922 words. The same group of words occurs more often in  $\Sigma$ Dem (18 times), thus the frequency of φιλανθρωπία and cognates in  $\Sigma$ Dem is 2373 ( $42706 \div 18$ ). The smaller the number indicating absolute frequency, the more often the term is used. Consequently, we can clearly see that Demosthenes mentions φιλανθρωπία more than twice as often as Aeschines. However, since  $\Sigma$ Aesch and  $\Sigma$ Dem, as we have seen, are roughly equivalent in size, the above discussed absolute frequency index does not reveal much further information about the use of the term.

Still, by the same means we can establish the frequency of phrases in the comprehensive collection of Attic orators. We need to divide the number of all words in the corpus by the number of times a given word occurs in it. E.g. the search for all possible inflected forms of φιλανθρωπία and its cognates yields 101 results, i.e. the absolute frequency index of this phrase is 6307, which means that in average one in 6307 words belongs to the mentioned phrase. This ratio indicates a lower frequency than what we attested in either of our two orators' works.

At this point we can gain more interesting results, if we quantify the relative frequency of Aeschines' use of a phrase compared to the number of occurrences in all other orators combined, including Demosthenes. The same way, we can determine the relative frequency in

Demosthenes, too. What we need is the *relative frequency index (RFI)*: the quotient of a term's absolute frequency in Aeschines (or in Demosthenes) and its absolute frequency in the corpus of other orators. If we return to the mentioned example of φιλανθρωπία, the rounded *RFI* of the phrase in Aeschines is 1.3, which is the ratio of 4880 (absolute frequency in Aeschines) and of 6447 (absolute frequency in all orators except Aechines). Based on the same algorithm, *RFI* of the same phrase in Demosthenes is almost precisely 3 ( $7160 \div 2373$ ).

φιλανθρωπία and cognates	Occurrence	Total word count	Absolute frequency
All orators	101	637 004	6 307
Orators except ΣAesch	92	593 083	6 447
Orators except ΣDem	83	594 298	7 160
ΣAesch	9	43 922	4 880
ΣDem	18	42 706	2 373
<b><i>RFI</i> in ΣAesch (<math>6447 \div 4880</math>)</b>			<b>1.3</b>
<b><i>RFI</i> in ΣDem (<math>7160 \div 2373</math>)</b>			<b>3</b>

*Table 3. Calculating relative frequency index (RFI) for φιλανθρωπία and cognates*

*RFI* can show if Aeschines applied a term (or group of terms) more often than all other orators or not. If *RFI* is 1, it indicates equal

frequency in  $\Sigma$ Aesch and in the collection of orators except  $\Sigma$ Aesch. If *RFI* is above 1, the phrase is mentioned more often by Aeschines; if it is below 1, then Aeschines turned to this phrase less frequently than other orators in average. If *RFI* reaches 2, it signifies double frequency, which is already remarkable. On the other hand, Demosthenes' *RFI* for φιλανθρωπία (3) provides excellent quantitative evidence for its significance in his political oratory, and it also corroborates M. Christ's views on the advancement of φιλανθρωπία as a democratic virtue in the lexicon of Demosthenes. Although Aeschines did not avoid φιλανθρωπία (in fact he used it slightly more often than the average of other Attic orators), he was clearly not capable of following his opponent in the sustained and consistently unique application of this term.

Nevertheless, examining the *RFI* of various phrases in the corpus of Aeschines helps us to find the key terms of Aeschinean oratory. Calculating *RFI* cannot be completely automated because of the morphological characteristics of the Greek language: some words have complex morphologies, and they may even have forms that are formally identical with other words, although their meaning is partly or entirely different. E.g. the abstract noun τύχη has the dative singular τύχηι, which coincides with the aorist subjunctive of the verb τυγχάνω

in third person singular.<sup>22</sup> Thus, if we are to determine the precise *RFI* of the noun τύχη in ΣAesch, we need to consider all dubious passages in order to exclude incorrect data from the research. As for now, Perseus and TLG (Diogenes) are not able to decide what dictionary headword or meaning is the correct one in similar cases, thus human control-check is essential in every instance.

### 2.3. DEFINING KEY TERMS

The Greek Vocabulary Tool of Perseus can easily list all dictionary entries within a corpus (in our case, ΣAesch), and each entry is given a Key Term Score. As the description claims:

*[W]ords with a high key term score appear relatively often in your selection of documents and relatively infrequently in the collection as a whole. Words with a high key-term score are an automatically extracted variety of keyword that provides an initial guide to important people, places, and concepts in your selection.*<sup>23</sup>

The vocabulary list of ΣAesch contains 4633 unique words, but sorting them by Key Term

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<sup>22</sup> The search for τύχη in ΣAesch yields three results, two of them deriving from τυγχάνω (Aeschn. 1.133, 2.9), and one from τύχη (Aeschn. 3.154).

<sup>23</sup> See <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/help/vocab>.

Score does not instantly provide us with a useful set of valuable Aeschinean keywords, because the catalogue lists numerous cognates as separate items (e.g. nine out of the ten first items on the vocabulary list sorted by Key Term Score are relatives of the  $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta$ - root), and because even identical elements appear several times, since the dictionary gives them various definitions (e.g.  $\omicron\upsilon$  is listed 18 times within the first 30 elements!). All in all, Perseus' Key Term Score list is not a reliable source of actual keywords in  $\Sigma$ Aesch, but it is suitable to give the reader of Aeschines a vague impression of what terms (or groups of terms) might be more important for the orator than others.

Still, relying both on the Key Term Score list and on what we might call general intuition (based on extensive readings of and on Aeschines), we composed a selection of twenty items including individual terms and also groups of cognates, which were all brought into investigation of frequency analysis in order to quantify their preponderance in the oratory of Aeschines. (See Table 4 below). Each of them is a content word that occurs at least 19 times in  $\Sigma$ Aesch (though most of them appear much more often), with a minimum *RFI* of 1.5.

Simultaneously, the very same words were control-checked in the corresponding speeches of Demosthenes ( $\Sigma$ Dem), since the genuine importance of a phrase in  $\Sigma$ Aesch can be highlighted after contrasting it with the use of



the term in the orations of the opponent. The true dominance in the use of a phrase by Aeschines is indicated by three factors: 1) a great number of occurrences (i.e. absolute frequency), 2) salient relative frequency (*RFI*) of the term, and 3) low *RFI* of the term on the side of Demosthenes. If all these conditions are met, then a specific phrase can be considered a prevalent key concept in the political communication of Aeschines, because Demosthenes consciously or incidentally ceded the ground in the application of the given term to his adversary. A good example of these dominant key concepts is νομοθέτης and its verbal cognate νομοθετέω, which occur altogether 44 times in the indictments of Aeschines. Since the entire collection of Attic orators contains only 167 references to the term, its *RFI* in ΣAesch is 4.8, which means that more than one in every four references to the νομοθετ- root is found in the speeches of Aeschines. On the other hand, Demosthenes did not utter this word at all in his speeches against Aeschines, thus the concept of νομοθεσία was used exclusively by Aeschines in their political debate.

In some cases, however, the condition described above in the third factor is not fulfilled, because the phrase was often used by both orators (i.e. high *RFI* value in ΣAesch and in ΣDem). This means that the concept was important for both either because it was a common topic that they intended to exhibit in

their own ways (as e.g. the word groups of πρέσβυς or εἰρήνη), or because neither of them was willing to surrender and let his opponent to appropriate the term (e.g. δῶρον and cognates, mutually applied against each other in the indictments and rather neglected in the defence speeches). In any case, these words are key concepts to Aeschines and Demosthenes alike.

Finally, the set of Aeschinean key words are supplemented by the frequency data of four elements that are well-known Demosthenic concepts: εὖνοια, πατρίς, τύχη and φιλανθρωπία.<sup>24</sup> He applied each of them skilfully in his speeches against Aeschines, who failed to neutralize them, although he may have been aware of Demosthenes' techniques, as it was pointed out concerning φιλανθρωπία in the Introduction. As for εὖνοια, we can add that Aeschines may have consciously avoided the term in his last speech, which is especially telling in light of the fact that εὖνοια was most probably mentioned in Ctesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenes in 336.<sup>25</sup> Had Aeschines

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<sup>24</sup> For εὖνοια, see especially Muñoz 1989 and Cook 2009; for πατρίς, see Nielsen 2004, 70–74 and Liddel 2007, 139–140; for τύχη (combined with καιρός, also used by Hyperides), see Wankel 1976, 908–910 and 976–977, Todd 2009, 169–171, and Horváth 2014, 105–114. For φιλανθρωπία, see Introduction.

<sup>25</sup> Cook 2009, 40. For the use of this term in contemporary inscriptions, see Whitehead 1993, 52–54,

believed that he could successfully discredit his enemy by claiming himself εὔνους (or Demosthenes lacking εὔνοια), he would have certainly used this word more frequently.<sup>26</sup> (He did not, as we can see in Table 4.) In his defence oration, however, Demosthenes put great emphasis on his civic loyalty (εὔνοια) towards Athens, showing its manifestations both in deeds and words, and he successfully replaced the cowardly deserter frame that Aeschines tried to force on him with the image of himself as a steadfast and loyal citizen.<sup>27</sup>

All key concepts listed in Table 4 are considered here as value-terms, i.e. representatives of certain ideals either in the private or in the public life of Athenian citizens. In the following chapter, we take a closer look at one of the key concepts of Aeschines, decency, to understand how the orator used it in an attempt to gain an upper hand over his opponents, Timarchus and Demosthenes.

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Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 200–202, 256–262, 274–277, 295, 304.

<sup>26</sup> “Aeschines finds the term [εὔνοια] tainted and so hopelessly connected with Demosthenes that he refuses to use the word and rejects its new semantic function of ‘civic loyalty’ and its resulting socio-political power.” (Cook 2009, 38.)

<sup>27</sup> Cook 2012, esp. 249–250, and see below chapter 4.1.

Key terms	Aeschines					Demosthenes			
	1	2	3	ΣAesch	<i>RFI</i>	19	18	ΣDem	<i>RFI</i>
ἀνδρεία (cognates)	18	16	46	<b>80</b>	<i>1.5</i>	15	17	<b>32</b>	<i>0.6</i>
βῆμα	10	5	15	<b>30</b>	<i>11.6</i>	2	4	<b>6</b>	<i>1.4</i>
δειλία (cognates)	5	6	15	<b>26</b>	<i>5.4</i>	4	2	<b>6</b>	<i>1</i>
δημοκρατία (cognates)	6	6	26	<b>38</b>	<i>3.2</i>	0	1	<b>1</b>	<i>0.07</i>
δημός(ιος)	27	60	122	<b>209</b>	<i>3</i>	41	23	<b>64</b>	<i>0.8</i>
δῶρον (cognates)	5	6	42	<b>53</b>	<i>2</i>	47	12	<b>59</b>	<i>2.3</i>
εἰρήνη (cognates)	1	57	35	<b>93</b>	<i>3.1</i>	94	32	<b>126</b>	<i>4.8</i>
ἐκκλησία(ζω)	13	22	37	<b>72</b>	<i>8</i>	13	6	<b>19</b>	<i>1.5</i>
ἐλευθερία (cognates)	24	8	10	<b>42</b>	<i>1.5</i>	6	15	<b>21</b>	<i>0.7</i>
καιρός	3	15	36	<b>54</b>	<i>2.3</i>	15	22	<b>37</b>	<i>1.5</i>
κόσμιος (cognates)	12	1	6	<b>19</b>	<i>2.7</i>	2	2	<b>4</b>	<i>0.5</i>
μετριότης (cognates)	10	2	10	<b>22</b>	<i>2.1</i>	3	8	<b>11</b>	<i>1</i>
νόμος	76	10	107	<b>193</b>	<i>1.5</i>	22	36	<b>58</b>	<i>0.4</i>

Key terms	Aeschines					Demosthenes			
	1	2	3	ΣAesch	<i>RFI</i>	19	18	ΣDem	<i>RFI</i>
νομοθέτης (cognates)	22	0	22	<b>44</b>	4.8	0	0	<b>0</b>	0
παιδεία (cognates)	11	3	14	<b>28</b>	3.6	0	2	<b>2</b>	0.2
παρανομέω (cognates)	3	3	40	<b>46</b>	3.5	0	5	<b>5</b>	0.3
πόρνος (cognates)	25	1	2	<b>28</b>	14.5	5	0	<b>5</b>	1.4
πρέσβυς (cognates)	9	144	52	<b>205</b>	11.8	124	31	<b>155</b>	7.6
ρήτωρ (cognates)	13	5	22	<b>40</b>	2.4	2	17	<b>19</b>	1.1
σωφροσύνη (cognates)	28	5	11	<b>44</b>	3.2	3	5	<b>8</b>	0.5
εὔνοια (cognates)	4	8	6	<b>18</b>	0.9	4	36	<b>40</b>	2.1
πατρίς	2	6	5	<b>13</b>	0.5	6	35	<b>41</b>	2
τύχη	0	5	4	<b>9</b>	0.6	3	30	<b>33</b>	2.5
φιланθρωπία (cognates)	2	5	2	<b>9</b>	1.3	10	8	<b>18</b>	3

Table 4. A frequency analysis of some key terms in ΣAesch and ΣDem.

### 3. Value-terms concerning decency

The principal value-terms of Aeschines concerning decent behaviour are σωφροσύνη,<sup>28</sup> μετρίότης,<sup>29</sup> κόσμος,<sup>30</sup> and (paradoxically) πόρνος.<sup>31</sup> These are all frequently and effectively wielded against Timarchus in Aeschn. 1, but their application in the subsequent orations is also detectable and significant.

The most prevalent of all phrases referring to decency is undoubtedly σωφροσύνη (*RFI* in ΣAesch: 3.2), coined from σῶς + φρήν, with a basic meaning 'soundness in mind'.<sup>32</sup> The term and its cognates display an abundance of semantic shades from Homer and the archaic

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<sup>28</sup> Cognates: σωφρονέω, σωφρόνως, σωφροσύνη, σῶφρων, τὸ σῶφρον. Occurrences (44): Aeschn. 1.3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 20, 22, 25, 48, 121, 122, 123, 133, 137, 139 (3x), 140, 141, 151 (2x), 156, 158, 159, 180, 181, 182, 189, 2.4, 151, 176, 180, 184, 3.2, 4, 117, 168, 170, 197, 234, 239, 242, 249, 257.

<sup>29</sup> Cognates: μέτριος, μετρίότης, μετρίως. Occurrences (22): Aeschn. 1.1, 3, 39, 42, 51 (2x), 70, 103, 162, 174, 2.173, 181, 3.1, 9, 11 (2x), 57, 61, 129, 133, 170, 218.

<sup>30</sup> Cognates: ἀκοσμία, εὐκοσμία, κοσμέω, κοσμητήρ, κόσμος, κόσμος. Occurrences (19): Aeschn. 1.8, 22 (2x), 34, 67, 169, 183 (4x), 189, 192, 2.108, 3.2, 4, 154, 185 (2x), 257.

<sup>31</sup> Cognates: πορνεία, πορνεῖον, πορνεύω, πόρνη, πορνικός, πορνοβοσκός, πόρνος. Occurrences (28): Aeschn. 1.29, 52, 70, 79, 94 (2x), 119 (2x), 120, 123, 124 (4x), 130, 136, 137, 154, 155, 157, 159, 188, 189, 2.144, 3.214, 246.

<sup>32</sup> For etymology, see Beekes 2010, 1441.

poetry until the language of playwrights and prose writers in classical Athens.<sup>33</sup> A common element in meaning is a kind of *self-control*, *prudence*, or *common sense*, which can manifest itself in various forms, whether intellectual or moral.<sup>34</sup>

A regular use of the abstract term σοφροσύνη in a moral sense is first attested in late archaic funerary inscriptions, as e.g. in the epitaph of Anaxilas of Naxos, a resident alien in Athens, “whom the Athenians honoured for his outstanding σοφροσύνη and valour.” (ὄν τίεσκον Ἀθηναῖοι μετέοικον / ἔχσοχα σοφροσύνης ἔνεκεν ἐδ’ ἄρετῃς. IG I<sup>3</sup> 1357, dated 510–500 BC.) Later on the phrase is frequently found in funerary context,<sup>35</sup> but interestingly, the term did not become an all-purpose cardinal virtue of the Athenians, since it was mostly applied to praising those of whom special moderation and obedience was expected, especially in moral issues: women, young men, and

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<sup>33</sup> Not to mention the rich post-classical, imperial, and patristic use of the term, see North 1966.

<sup>34</sup> The intellectual and moral content of the concept never separated sharply: “Σοφροσύνη est santé d’esprit, soit intellectuelle, soit éthique. Bien que ces deux moments divergent, ils ne sont pas séparés dans la conscience grecque.” (Vries 1943, 99.)

<sup>35</sup> See Peek 1960 and (especially for epigrams in 4<sup>th</sup> c. BC) Tsagalis 2008, 135–160.

metics.<sup>36</sup> The term is rarely used in the epitaphs of men who grew older than the ephebic age.<sup>37</sup>

Beyond grave epigraphs, σωφροσύνη was often mentioned in honorific inscriptions. The ἔνεκα-sentences justifying public approbation granted to ephebes and their leaders are strikingly similar to those we can see in earlier epitaphs: they are crowned for their valour and for their σωφροσύνη.<sup>38</sup> As the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* confirms, the leaders of the ephebes are called the σωφρονιστής and the κοσμητής, elected by members of each *phyle* from men over the age of forty.<sup>39</sup> As the name suggests, their principal duty was to make ephe-

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<sup>36</sup> Whitehead 1993, 71, cf. North 1960, 131. Epigrams for women with σωφροσύνη in 4<sup>th</sup> c. BC: IG II<sup>2</sup> 5239, 6693a, 6858, 9057, 11162, 11169, 11974, 12924a, 13071, 13086; Peek, AG II 179; BCH 73 (1949) 527; SEG 25:299, 42:212, 46:304. Epigrams for young men: IG II<sup>2</sup> 5768, 6626, 6859, 11103; SEG 13:223. Metics with σωφροσύνη are rare both in epitaphs (IG II<sup>2</sup> 8464), and in honorific decrees (IG II<sup>2</sup> 145, 1186).

<sup>37</sup> For exceptions, see IG II<sup>2</sup> 5452 (male citizen over 90 years), 13098 (male citizen over 70), and (perhaps) SEG 13:181 (age unspecified).

<sup>38</sup> The sentence “ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ σωφροσύνης” is found several times in Inscr. 8, 9, and 17 in Reinmuth 1971. The term σωφροσύνη is always accompanied by ἀρετή or εὐσεβεία in honorific inscriptions, see Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 223.

<sup>39</sup> See [Aristot.] *Ath.* 42.2–5, with Rhodes 1981, 502–510. Aeschines claimed that those over forty are in “the age of greatest self-control” (ἐν τῇ σωφρονεστάτῃ αὐτοῦ ἡλικίᾳ ὄν, Aeschn. 1.11).



bes decent (σωφρόνες) and orderly (κόσμοι). All extant ephebic inscriptions referring to σωφροσύνη are dated after Epicrates' law (c. 335 BC), which reformed and institutionalized traditional *ephebia*, i.e. the military and patriotic training of the youth.<sup>40</sup>

The virtue of σωφροσύνη in the preserved speeches of Attic orators is an important quality of the good citizen who, according to the analysis of Adriaan Rademaker, features three characteristics:

*The σώφρων πολίτης as portrayed by the Attic orators is one who is (i) 'decent' in social interaction and sexual matters, and 'moderate' in his desires and expenses, (ii) 'just' and law-abiding' and not given to violence and ὕβρις against his fellow citizens, and (iii) 'quiet' and ἀπράγμων to the point of ignorance of the procedures of the law courts. As the juridical issues of cases vary, σωφροσύνη may be invoked to commend any of these qualities, or a combination of them.<sup>41</sup>*

Examining the above characteristics of the value-term in the speeches of Aeschines, we can see that he often plays with the intellectual

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<sup>40</sup> For the traditional ephebia and its reform, see Faraguna 1992, 274–280; Liddel 2007, 290–293.

<sup>41</sup> Rademaker 2005, 234. See also Dover 1974, 119–123, and Roisman 2005, 176–185.

and the moral facets of meaning, especially in his indictment against Timarchus. The superficial interpretation may well be common sense on the intellectual level, but every single occurrence of the term can be also comprehended in a deeper layer as well, where the underlying meaning is moral self-control, or the mastering of bodily desires. The nature of the case against Timarchus, an alleged former male prostitute (πόρνος),<sup>42</sup> enables him to play with the meaning of the phrase, because σωφροσύνη represents exactly the self-control that Timarchus had fallen short of on moral and intellectual level alike, with special regards to his sexual behaviour. As, for example, Aeschines claims in the exposition of the speech, Timarchus “was free not to play a sycophantic prosecutor against me, if he had any sense” (ἐμὲ δ’ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἐσωφρόνει, μὴ συκοφαντεῖν, Aeschn. 1.3). Therefore the reason for the present trial is that Timarchus had no *sense* at all – or rather that he had no self-control to restrain from various forms of debauched activities? Once Timarchus is framed as a bad citizen who committed *hybris* even against his own body,<sup>43</sup> and who presents grave danger to the σωφροσύνη of the

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<sup>42</sup> Since Aeschines provided no clear evidence, it is impossible to tell if the charges were true or false, but see Fisher 2001, 53–67.

<sup>43</sup> See Aeschn. 1.22, 108, 116, 185, 188. For the bad citizen frame working on Timarchus, see Cook 2012, 223–226.

youth,<sup>44</sup> every occurrence of the value-term or of its cognates can be (and perhaps should be) understood on a moral level as well.<sup>45</sup>

Besides σωφροσύνη, Aeschines also used the other words of decency (μετριοτήτης, κόσμιος, and even πόρνος) for at least three different purposes in his orations. First, he took advantage of these terms to reflect on his own character (self-positioning), second, he defined his democratic political ideals, and third, he portrayed his enemies as deterrent examples because of their lack of decency.

### 3.1. DECENCY FOR SELF-POSITIONING

While he attacked Timarchus for speaking in front of the people in spite of his immoral, immoderate, and disorderly way of life, Aeschines obviously needed to portray himself as an opposite character: moral, moderate, and orderly. This *ethos* is carefully built with numerous references to decency, starting in the very first sentences of his indictment:

*Never before, men of Athens, have I brought an indictment against any man or persecuted him at his final audit; no, I have in my opin-*

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<sup>44</sup> Aeschines repeatedly expresses his concerns for the youth, see Aeschn. 1.8–10, 22, 117, 121, 155, 191, 195, and also Aeschn. 2.180. 3.245–246.

<sup>45</sup> See e.g. Aeschn. 1.123: ἃ μέλλω λέγειν ἀκούσας εἰσαϋθίς οὐ χρήσῃ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς; cf. also Aeschn. 3.117, 242.

*ion demonstrated myself to be moderate in all such matters. But since I could see that the city was suffering serious damage from this man Timarchus, etc.*<sup>46</sup>

Aeschines claims himself a moderate (μέτριος) person, because he has never indicted anyone, that is, as Rademaker put it, he has always been quiet and ἀπράγμων, but the harms Timarchus has done to the city are beyond all measure, thus Aeschines had no choice but to arraign him.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, he adds the remark in the prologue of his speech: “I hope that I have spoken **moderately** in my opening words on this matter.” (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων **μετρίως** ἐλπίζω μοι προειρηθῆναι, Aeschn. 1.3.)<sup>48</sup> Interestingly, the structure Aeschines applied to reflect on his own moderation in the first sentence (μέτριον ἑμαυτὸν ... παρεσχηκώς) was used against him by Demosthenes three

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<sup>46</sup> Aeschn. 1.1: Οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε γραφὴν γραψάμενος οὔτ' ἐν εὐθύναις λυπήσας, ἀλλ' ὥς ἔγωγε νομίζω **μέτριον ἑμαυτὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων παρεσχηκώς**, ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν τε πόλιν μεγάλα βλαπτομένην ὑπὸ Τιμάρχου...

<sup>47</sup> Aeschines promised to explain clearly how he had become the victim of Timarchus' malicious prosecution, but ultimately he did not return to this question, see Fisher 2001, 121–122.

<sup>48</sup> See also Aeschn. 1.39: Σκέψασθε δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μετρίως μέλλω πρὸς φέρεσθαι Τιμάρχῳ τουτῷ, and Aeschn. 3.9: Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ὅλης κατηγορίας μετρίως μοι ἐλπίζω προειρηθῆναι.

years later in the trial on the Embassy (μέτριοι παρεῖχεν ἑαυτόν), when he described how modestly Aeschines had conducted himself before he turned into an evil and boastful politician:

*Before he caused the city every kind of harm, he would admit that he was a public clerk and owed you thanks for being elected to the post, and **he showed himself to be a moderate person.***<sup>49</sup>

But Aeschines, at least in his own words, continued to show himself a self-restrained citizen who has always lived a moderate life and tried everything possible to protect good order and decency in both private and public life.<sup>50</sup> In the end of the trial on the Embassy, while begging the judges to acquit him of the charges, he even referred back to the case of Timarchus to underscore the importance of being σώφρων and μέτριος:

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<sup>49</sup> Demosth. 19.314: πρὸ μὲν τοῦ πάντα κάκ' εἰργάσθαι τὴν πόλιν ὡμολόγει γεγραμματαυκέναι καὶ χάριν ὑμῖν ἔχειν τοῦ χειροτονηθῆναι, καὶ **μέτριοι παρεῖχεν ἑαυτόν**. (Modified translation of H. Yunis, see Yunis 2005.) The same structure is found several times in Demosthenes' speech against Meidias, see Demosth. 21.128, 134, 186, 199.

<sup>50</sup> To protect his own practice in erotic relationships, Aeschines differentiated between decent and corrupted love on the basis of the participants' character, whether they are σώφρονες or not, see Aeschn. 1.135–137.

*All of you who are fathers with sons or who care for your younger brothers, remember that I have issued a **call for decency** that will never be forgotten through my prosecution of Timarchus. And as to all the rest whom I have never vexed with my conduct, an ordinary man in fortune and as **moderate** as any of you, and in political struggles the only one of all of them who has not colluded against you, I urge you to save me.*<sup>51</sup>

Self-positioning with the words of decency is also attested in Aeschines' oration against Ctesiphon (330), where he anticipates Demosthenes' criticism concerning his ἡσυχία, i.e. his retreat from political activities in the past years. Aeschines claims that his quietness derives from the μετρίότης of his character:

*My silence, Demosthenes, is the product of **my restrained way of life**. I am satisfied with little and have no desire for greater wealth acquired shamefully; as a result, I both keep*

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<sup>51</sup> Aeschn. 2.180–181: ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν πατέρες εἰσὶ παίδων ἢ νεωτέρους ἀδελφούς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆσθε, ἀναμνησθέντες ὅτι **τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης παράκλησιν** διὰ τῆς περὶ Τίμαρχον κρίσεως ἀεμνήστως παρακέκληκα, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἅπαντας, οἷς ἑμαυτὸν ἄλυπον παρέσχημαι, τὴν μὲν τύχην ιδιώτης ὢν καὶ τοῖς **μετρίοις** ὑμῶν ὅμοιος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσι μόνος τῶν ἄλλων ἐφ' ὑμᾶς οὐ συνεστηκώς, αἰτῶ παρ' ὑμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν. See Paulsen 1999, 417.

*silent and speak with a set purpose, not under the pressure of an extravagant nature.*<sup>52</sup>

### 3.2. DECENCY AS POLITICAL IDEAL

The second purpose of using words of decency is to set up a political ideal for all democrats. In a very intriguing passage of the speech against Ctesiphon, Aeschines defines the essentials for an individual who is friend of the people (δημοτικός).<sup>53</sup> He warns the audience not to trust the words of Demosthenes, lest they be deceived; but rather they should concentrate their attention on his character to see if it meets the proper standard.

*I shall reckon up together with you the qualities **a democrat and decent man** should naturally possess, and then I shall set against them the character to be expected of an oligarch and a base man.*<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Aesch. 3.218: Τὴν δ' ἐμὴν σιωπὴν, ὦ Δημοσθένης, **ἢ τοῦ βίου μετριότης** παρεσκεύασεν· ἀρκεῖ γάρ μοι μικρά, καὶ μειζόνων αἰσχρῶς οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶ, ὥστε καὶ σιγῶ καὶ λέγω βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δαπάνης.

<sup>53</sup> Aesch. 3.168–170.

<sup>54</sup> Aesch. 3.168: Ἐγὼ μὲν μεθ' ὑμῶν λογιόμην ἃ δεῖ ὑπάρξαι ἐν τῇ φύσει **τῷ δημοτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σώφρονι**, καὶ ἀντιθήσω ποῖόν τινα εἰκός ἐστιν εἶναι τὸν ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ φαῦλον.

As we see, Aeschines openly contrasts a man (ἄνθρωπος) who is a democrat (δημοτικός) and has self-restraint (σώφρων) with a person (ἄνθρωπος), who is ὀλιγαρχικός (oligarchic) and φαῦλος (base). The oppositions are telling: the ideal politician is not merely a person but a man;<sup>55</sup> he friends with the people and not with the few who try to rule them,<sup>56</sup> and last, he is not base but decent. He does not need to explain which of the two categories Demosthenes belongs to.

The list of conditions that make a man δημοτικός can be briefly summarized as follows (Aeschn. 3.169–170): 1) free birth, 2) his ancestors' services to the city, 3) decent and moderate disposition, 4) sound judgement and ability to speak, and 5) courage. As for now, it is necessary to quote the third point in full length:

*Third, he should show a **decent and moderate** disposition in his daily life, so that he*

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<sup>55</sup> Aeschines rarely calls Demosthenes a man, but often questions his virility (Aeschn. 2.23, 148, 179, 3.155), sometimes even calling him an effeminate κίναδος (Aeschn. 1.131, 181; 2.88, 99, 151), see Fisher 2001, 272–273, Roisman 2005: 177, and Matuszewski 2011, 124–135.

<sup>56</sup> See Aeschines' theoretical discussions of states, Aeschn. 1.4–6, 3.6, 207, with Fisher 2001, 123–124.



*will not be led by excessive spending to take bribes against the interests of the people.*<sup>57</sup>

We could say that Aeschines merely repeats one feature (being σώφρων) that he has mentioned in the introduction of this passage, and thus his third point is bombastic or tautologous: a decent democrat must be decent and moderate. However, we can also underscore that he explicitly connects two value-terms of decency (σωφροσύνη and μετριότης) in this excerpt, which he does not do frequently,<sup>58</sup> even though the combination of these phrases can be found already in Plato,<sup>59</sup> in Aristotle,<sup>60</sup> and in some of the orators as well.<sup>61</sup> The point here is to highlight the importance of decency as an essential element in the *ethos* of a democratic citizen, and simultaneously, to deny its existence in the character of his opponent: “Observe now which of these qualities Demosthenes can claim.” (σκέψασθε δὴ τί τούτων ὑπάρχει Δημοσ-

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<sup>57</sup> Aeschn. 3.170: Τρίτον **σώφρονα καὶ μέτριον** χρὴ πεφυκέναι αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν καθ’ ἡμέραν δίκαιαν, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τῆς δαπάνης δωροδοκῇ κατὰ τοῦ δήμου.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. above Aeschn. 2.180–181.

<sup>59</sup> E.g. Plat. *Rp* 399b: σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως, cf. 560d.

<sup>60</sup> E.g. Aristot. *EN*. 1125b: τὸν δ’ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα.

<sup>61</sup> E.g. Isocr. 7.4, Demosth. 6.19, 21.128, 25.76–77, *Pr.* 43.

θένει, Aeschn. 3.170.) As we are told here, decency is important for a δημοτικός man in order to lead a simple and inexpensive way of life,<sup>62</sup> because excessive spending leads way to bribery (δωροδοκία), which is another recurring charge against Demosthenes.<sup>63</sup>

### 3.3. LACK OF DECENCY: DETERRENT EXAMPLES

The third reason for utilizing the words of decency in the orations of Aeschines was to call the audience's attention to the dangers of the lack of moderate, orderly, and self-controlled behaviour. What is going to happen to the city, if the intrigues and pleas of certain people succeed to "prevent the moderate and habitual way of justice?"<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Cf. the fancy clothes and wealth of Demosthenes, Aeschn. 1.131, and MacDowell 2009, 30–36.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. e.g. Aeschn. 3.58, 69, 81, 94, 104–105, 129, 143, 149, 156, 209, 214, 221, 238–240, 244, 257, 259. As the frequency analysis of δῶρον and its cognates revealed (above), Demosthenes iterated the charge of bribery in the case of the Embassy (343), while Aeschines did the same against his opponent in 330. For the contemporary problems of gift-giving and bribery, see Mitchell 1997, 148–166.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Aeschn. 3.1: Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾶτε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν ὅση γεγένηται, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν δεήσεις, αἷς κέχρηται τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ **τὰ μέτρια** καὶ τὰ συνήθη μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει.

*If a man has shown **contempt for the laws and for morality** on the most important issues, he has a certain attitude of mind that is visible from his **disorderly** manner.*<sup>65</sup>

Overlooking or despising some of the major values, τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, is characteristic of a person whose habits are without proper order. His ἀκοσμία makes him both repulsive and dangerous to law and order. The combination of σώφρων and κόσμιος is also attested elsewhere in the speeches of Aeschines (always in reference with the alleged laws of Solon),<sup>66</sup> and it is rather common in contemporary literary sources as well.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, as we could see in the ephebic inscriptions, these values are primarily expected from young Athenians attending the ἐφηβία, as their principal leaders were named accordingly (σωφρονιστής and κοσμητής).

In the speech against Timarchus, the lack of σωφροσύνη identifies the corruptive behaviour of a ὑβριστής, i.e. a person committing *hybris*. When Aeschines gives a definition of the

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<sup>65</sup> Aeschn. 1.189: Ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγίστων **τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ὑπεριδὼν**, ἔχει τινὰ ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἣ διάδηλος ἐκ τῆς **ἀκοσμίας** τοῦ τρόπου γίγνεται.

<sup>66</sup> See Aeschn. 1.22, 3.2, 257.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. Lys. 3.4, 14.41, 19.16, 21.19 (with commentary, Kapellos 2013, 138–140); Plat. *Phaed.* 114e, *Alcib.* 1.122c, *Gorg.* 508a, *Leg.* 802e;

decent and the indecent types of love, he declares:

*According to my definition, desire for those who are noble and **decent** is characteristic of the generous and discerning spirit, but debauchery based on hiring someone for money I consider characteristic of a **wanton and uncultivated man**.*<sup>68</sup>

Still, ὕβρις with its cognates is only one of the several negative terms that are used in reference to the lack of σωφροσύνη, but not the most common one. The word πόρνος and its numerous related forms are the strongest phrases in the oratory of Aeschines that allude to indecent forms of behaviour. Evidently, most occurrences of πόρνος are found in the speech against Timarchus (usually the defendant is named a πόρνος or is repeatedly said to have prostituted himself, πεπορνευμένος),<sup>69</sup> but the formal target of the trial on the Crown, Ctesiphon was also called a pimp (πορνοβοσκός) twice.<sup>70</sup> Though the reason for this latter

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<sup>68</sup> Aeschn. 1.137: Ὅρίζομαι δ' εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν καὶ **σωφρόνων** φιλανθρώπου πάθος καὶ εὐγνώμονος ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀσελγαίνειν ἀργυρίου τινα μισθοῦμενον **ὕβριστοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου ἀνδρὸς** ἐργον εἶναι.

<sup>69</sup> Aeschn. 1.52, 70, 79, 94, 119, 130, 154, 159, 188, 189, cf. also Aeschn. 2.144.

<sup>70</sup> Aeschn. 3.214 (πορνοβοσκία), 246 (πορνοβοσκός).

naming is not clear, it is obviously used to denigrate Ctesiphon by linking him with a profession not worthy of a σώφρων citizen.<sup>71</sup> Demosthenes himself could not avoid gaining sobriquets with unsavoury sexual overtures, either. Although he was never called a πόρνος, Aeschines sometimes refers to him with his childhood nickname Batalos,<sup>72</sup> and his alleged effeminacy was scourged by calling him a pervert catamite (κίναιδος).<sup>73</sup> At one point, Aeschines made a clear and even ‘quantifiable’ contrast between σώφρονες (who are similar to Aeschines’ brother-in-law, Philon) and κίναιδοι (who are exactly like Demosthenes), claiming that the former ones are worth at least three times more than the latter:

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<sup>71</sup> Aristotle calls pimps ἀνελευθέρους, Aristot. *EN*. 1121b. See also Kapparis 1999, 229. We know hardly anything for sure about Ctesiphon beside the fact that he had proposed the crown for Demosthenes, see MacDowell 2000, 211, cf. Carey 2001, 159–160.

<sup>72</sup> Aeschn. 1.126, 131, 164, 2.99, the name is perhaps a hint to Demosthenes’ bottoms. (See *Schol. in Aeschn.* 1.126: Βάταλος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐκαλεῖτο, καθότι μεγάλα καθίσματα εἶχεν. [273b] Βάταλον – καταπύγωνα καὶ μαλακόν. [275]) Demosthenes referred to his name as Battalos (perhaps alluding to his former speech impediment, cf. βατταρίζω), Demosth. 18.180. See Lambin 1982.

<sup>73</sup> Aeschn. 1.131, 181, 2.88, 99, 151, cf. also 3.167. Demosthenes, in turn, called Aeschines a fox (κίναδος), which might well be a pun for κίναιδος, see Kamen 2014. For κιναιδία, see Dover 1989, 75–76, Matuszewski 2011, 124–135.

*I am astonished that you have the nerve to insult Philon, and furthermore among the most upright citizens of Athens, who have come here to give judgement in the best interests of the city and are more concerned with our way of life than with our speeches. Do you think they would wish to have 10,000 infantrymen like Philon with bodies as fit as his and minds as **decent**, or 30,000 **perverts** of your sort?*<sup>74</sup>

\* \* \*

As we can see, Aeschines made use of the words referring to decency (or to its absence) for three purposes. First, he wanted to produce an image of himself in front of all the people of Athens as a citizen who embodies the virtues of σωφροσύνη, κοσμιότης, and μετριότης. Self-positioning himself as a champion of these values seemed an obvious strategy against Timarchus, whose reputation as a prostitute (whether true or false) evidently made him vul-

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<sup>74</sup> Aeschn. 2.150–151: Ἐκπέπληγμαι δέ, εἰ σὺν λοιδορεῖν Φίλωνα τολμᾷς, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς ἐπικεκστάτοις Ἀθηναίων, οἳ δεῦρο εἰσεληλύθασι δικάσοντες ἔνεκα τοῦ βελτίστου τῆς πόλεως, καὶ μᾶλλον προσέχουσι τοῖς βίοις ἡμῶν ἢ τοῖς λόγοις. Πότερα γὰρ ἂν προσδοκᾷς αὐτοὺς εὐξασθαι μυρίους ὀπλίτας ὁμοίους Φίλωνι γενέσθαι, καὶ τὰ σώματα οὕτω διακειμένους καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω **σώφρονας**, ἢ τρισμυρίους **κιναιίδους** οἷους περ σὺ;

nerable to moral charges. After the successful prosecution of Timarchus, Aeschines may have found it useful to keep the image of the σώφρων citizen, therefore he continued to reflect on his own character accordingly in his subsequent orations. Second, he consciously made decency an essential character trait of the good politician (ἀνὴρ δημοτικός) in his oration on the Crown. This is remarkable, because this virtue had been primarily (though not exclusively) praised in connection with women, young men, and foreigners, who were not typically excelling in the political arena. And third, Aeschines used the terms of decency to traduce his opponents by displaying them as e.g. a πόρνος (Timarchus), a πορνόβοσκος (Ctesiphon), or a κίναιδος (Demosthenes), all of them falling short of the virtue of σωφροσύνη. All these uses made the words of decency powerful value-terms in the oratory of Aeschines.

However, Demosthenes was probably not ignorant of the way Aeschines used these value-terms in their political struggle. As it is obvious from the frequency analysis, Demosthenes did rely on these words as often as his opponent did,<sup>75</sup> but there is a passage in his speech on the Embassy that referred back to the trial of Timarchus, and thus it indicated his awareness

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<sup>75</sup> Σωφροσύνη (and cognates): Demosth. 18.215 (2x), 216, 19.196, 251, 285 (3x); μετριότης (and cognates): Demosth. 18.4, 10, 18, 102, 126, 256, 278, 321; κόσμος (and cognates): Demosth. 18.216, 287, 19.255 (2x).

of Aeschines' endeavours to appropriate the position of decency:

*Aeschines ruined Timarchus not, by Zeus, out of concern for making your children's character decent, for they already possess decent character, Athenians, and may the city never fare so badly that our young men need Aphobetus and Aeschines as their **guards of decency**...*<sup>76</sup>

On the one hand, calling Aeschines and his brother Aphobetus σωφρονισταί may remind us of the elected leaders of the *ephebes*, the σωφρονιστής and the κοσμητής, who were mentioned in the ephebic inscriptions of the 330s BC.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, the sarcastic remark of Demosthenes is perfectly designed to demolish the image of the σώφρων citizen that Aeschines has carefully constructed of himself, since it ridicules him in the role he deliberately tried to take and maintain. He made great efforts to gain a certain moral superiority over

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<sup>76</sup> Demosth. 19.285: καὶ τοῦτον [Τίμαρχον] ἀπώλεσεν, οὐ μὰ Δί' οὐχὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων παίδων, ὅπως ἔσσονται σώφρονες, προορῶν (εἰσὶ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ νῦν σώφρονες· μὴ γὰρ οὕτω γένοιτο κακῶς τῇ πόλει ὥστ' Ἀφοβήτου καὶ Αἰσχίνου **σωφρονιστῶν** δεηθῆναι τοὺς νεωτέρους)...

<sup>77</sup> See above. The term σωφρονιστής was commonly used well before the Lycurgan ephebic reforms, see e.g. Thuc. 6.87, Plat. *R.P.* 471a.



his opponents in order to be able to define what constituted a good or a bad citizen. Though σωφροσύνη is not the only virtue that makes someone a good citizen according to Aeschines (as we could see, several other value-terms were at his hand), but it unique importance for him, since it provided him with an eminent status to make difference between acceptable or unacceptable desires and actions, and ultimately between good and bad citizens as well. That is why Aeschines always took references threatening his moral higher ground very seriously.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> See e.g. Aeschn. 1.135 (on his love affairs in the palaestra), 2.4 and 153 (on the alleged drunken violence against an Olynthian woman, cf. Demosth. 19.196–198); and 3.216, anticipating Demosthenes' attack on Aeschines for spending a lot of time with younger men in the gymnasia. This latter attack, however, is not found in the extant text of Demosth. 18.

## 4. Comments on further value-terms

In this short chapter we briefly survey further values beyond decency that are used with great frequency in the orations of Aeschines. All value-terms would deserve a detailed analysis, but here we are confined to highlight only some of the major points.

### 4.1. *COURAGE*

The overwhelming number of references to words of courage and of cowardice seems to confirm the point of Brad L. Cook, who maintains that a key element of Aeschines' argumentation against Demosthenes in the Crown speech was the cowardly-deserter frame. Demosthenes notoriously escaped the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC (along with thousands of other Athenian citizens), but Aeschines expanded the concept of cowardice by taking great pains to explain everything about Demosthenes according to the interpretation framework of him as a coward.<sup>79</sup>

In the frequency analysis of terms, the following words were taken into account (all occurrences in ΣAesch are given in parentheses): ἀνδραγαθία (5), ἀνδρεία (2), ἀρετή (27), θαρσύνω (1), θράσος (5), and τόλμα (40) as words of courage (*RFI* 1.5), and ἀνανδ-

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<sup>79</sup> See Cook 2009 and 2012. For Demosthenes' desertion, see Christ 2006, 134–142.

ρία (10), δειλία (14), μαλακία (2) as words of cowardice (*RFI* 5.4).

We need to remark that ἀρετή and ἀνδραγαθία are terms that occur frequently in honorific decrees of the period, and they do not necessarily mean (battlefield) courage in contemporary language, but rather virtue in general (ἀρετή) and civic excellence (ἀνδραγαθία).<sup>80</sup> However, Aeschines consciously forced this traditional meaning in order to frame his opponent as a coward.

Furthermore, τόλμα and its cognates substantiate an audacious and daring kind of courage, which is always considered negative in the language of Aeschines, as e.g. Demosthenes “had the nerve ... to speak in praise of their courage” (ἐτόλμησε ... ἐγκωμιάζειν τὴν ἐκείνων ἀρετήν. *Aeschn.* 3.152). Therefore, whenever his opponents are appalled with a word of courage, it already means the wrong sort of courage.

#### 4.2. EDUCATION

Aeschines used the words of education (παιδεία [8], παιδεύω [10]) and lack of education (ἀπαιδευσία [4], ἀπαίδευτος [6]) strikingly

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<sup>80</sup> See Whitehead 1993, 57–62, Cook 2009, 34–35. For all possible combinations of ἀρετή, ἀνδραγαθία, and other value-terms in public approbation, see Veligianni-Terzi 1997, *passim*.

often (*RFI* 3.6), especially compared to Demosthenes (who only used παιδεία [2], *RFI* 0.2).

Though Aeschines came from a relatively humble social background, and it is unlikely that he ever had a formal rhetorical training,<sup>81</sup> he preferred to include an unusual amount of classical poetry (Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, etc.) into all his speeches.<sup>82</sup> In the oration against Timarchus, Aeschines claims that one of the generals speaking in defence of the accused is soon going to cite a lot of poetry to make a boast of his education (παιδεία) and to show his contempt to ordinary citizens. Therefore, Aeschines says, “to show you that we have already acquired a little knowledge and learning, we, too, shall say something on the subject” (ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς τι ἤδη ἠκούσαμεν καὶ ἐμάθομεν, λέξομέν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς περὶ τούτων. Aeschn. 1.141). Here Aeschines identifies himself (in first person plural) with the ordinary people sitting in the audience, speaking in their name against the elitist, swell-headed General.<sup>83</sup>

Curiously, when Demosthenes does mention παιδεία, he sneeringly reflects on Aes-

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<sup>81</sup> Harris 1995, 28–29. On classical Greek education, see Too 2001.

<sup>82</sup> See Ford 1999.

<sup>83</sup> For the relationship between the elite and the ordinary people with regards to education, see Ober 1989, 156–191. For the primacy of Athenian “popular culture” as opposed to elite culture, and its role in the institutions, see Canevaro 2017.

chines' fondness of the term, because he appealed to "understanding and education" (σύνεσιν καὶ παιδείαν, Demosth. 18.127). "And what gives you the right to talk about education?" (ποῦ δὲ παιδείας σοὶ θέμις μνησθῆναι; Demosth. 18.128.)

### 4.3. DEMOCRACY

It is interesting to point out that there is a conspicuous difference between Demosthenes and Aeschines in the frequency of terms referring to the form of government and to some of the basic institutions of the state.<sup>84</sup> A fundamental phrase is δῆμος and its adjective δημόσιος. Leaving the obvious semantic variation aside (i.e. both words may have numerous meanings), we can see that these terms are much more prevalent in the speeches of Aeschines (209 occurrences, *RFI* 3) than in Demosthenes (64 occurrences, *RFI* 0.8). We need to add here that the noun δῆμος occurs 42 times in the spurious documents of Demosth. 18, thus it is essential to work with the calibrated corpus, as described above in chapter 2.

What is even more surprising is that the term δημοκρατία, with 38 occurrences and an outstanding *RFI* (3.2) in ΣAesch, is almost completely absent from the vocabulary of ΣDem (*RFI* 0.07), and the entire corpus of genuine Demosthenic texts contains the word

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<sup>84</sup> For the term in general, see Hansen 1991, 69–71.

only 22 times. The only occasion we can find it in ΣDem is when the speaker tells the curious case of a disenfranchised Athenian citizen, Antiphon, who came back to the city to burn the dockyards on the command of Philip II.<sup>85</sup> However, when Demosthenes arrested him, “that malicious Aeschines shouted and shrieked that in a democracy it was intolerable for me to assault hapless citizens...” (βοῶν ὁ βάσκανος οὗτος καὶ κεκραγώς, ὥς ἐν δημοκρατία δεινὰ ποιῶ τοὺς ἡτυχηκότας τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζων... Demosth. 18.132.) Demosthenes, interestingly, did not seem to be fond of the word ‘democracy’: the only time he used it in his speeches against Aeschines was when he gave the phrase into the mouth of his opponent in *oratio obliqua*. For Aeschines, on the other hand, δημοκρατία was a frequently used political value-term, together with its representative institution (ἐκκλησία), and with the symbolic centre of political activity: the speakers’ platform (βῆμα).

#### 4.4. LAW

The terms connected to the idea of law form another important group of political concepts for Aeschines. Respect for law is paramount in all works of Attic orators, and the word νόμος occurs in their entire corpus 1873 times. (This figure is somewhat exaggerated, because it was

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<sup>85</sup> See Harris 1995, 121.

impossible to calibrate the search for all inflected forms of νόμος in the whole corpus of orators, therefore the result also includes interjected references of the manuscripts indicating that a legal text was to be read out during the trial.) Considering the prevalence of νόμος in the orators, its relative frequency in the speeches of Aeschines is remarkable (*RFI* 1.5), especially compared to that of Demosthenes (*RFI* 0.44).

The first and the third speeches of Aeschines contain most of the occurrences of νόμος (183 out of 193), because a prosecutor needed to stress the rule of law more often than a defendant. Similarly, the cognates of *giving a law* (νομοθετέω, *RFI* 4.8) and *trespassing the law* (παρανομέω, *RFI* 3.5) are much more common in the indictments: Aeschines quoted and interpreted several laws in the introductory section of these speeches, specifying the law-giver's intentions and insisting that the defendant had transgressed every one of them, even those that had very little to do with the actual case on trial.<sup>86</sup> This scrupulous legal reasoning may have prevented the audience from noticing that Aeschines had rather little hard evidence to prove his case against Timarchus and Ctesiphon.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, frequent repetition of

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<sup>86</sup> See e.g. Dover 1989, 27–28, 38–39.

<sup>87</sup> Whether the legal arguments against Ctesiphon's motion are well-founded or not is still a matter of debate among scholars, see Harris 2017, 105–117.

the words strengthened the image of the orator as a competent and law-abiding politician.

According to the frequency analysis, Aeschines dominated the field in all words connected to laws, especially with νομοθέτης, which is completely absent from the vocabulary of ΣDem.<sup>88</sup> However, no explicit reaction can be noticed in the speeches of Demosthenes concerning Aeschines' preference for the terms of law.

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<sup>88</sup> The term νομοθέτης and its cognates are often used by Demosthenes in his oration against Timocrates (Demosth. 24).



## 5. Conclusion

Modern computer databases enable us to select, measure, compare, and search various corpora of ancient texts. Speeches of the Athenian orator Aeschines (Aeschn. 1–3) can be easily selected from the corpus of Attic orators and compared to specific orations of Demosthenes (Demosth. 18–19) both in size and in content. The most commonly used phrases of Aeschines need to be contrasted with the frequency of the same terms within the corresponding speeches of Demosthenes, and also within the entire collection of orators. The resulting proportion is called relative frequency index (*RFI*), which can help us to find the most important key concepts that Aeschines applied in his political struggles against his opponents, Timarchus, Ctesiphon, and most of all, Demosthenes.

Key concepts of Aeschines can be grouped in thematic categories, the most fundamental of which is the group of value-terms that define decent behaviour: σωφροσύνη, μετριότης, and κοσμιότης. Decency is a principal concept in the oratory of Aeschines, since it is utilized for three different purposes. First, value-terms attached to decency are used by the speaker to create his own political position as a decent, moderate, and orderly citizen. Second, Aeschines named decency as one of the five important character traits that made somebody

a good politician (δημοσικὸς ἀνὴρ). Third, he tried to denigrate his opponents by showing how they fell short of decency. All these were designed to secure a moral high ground to Aeschines, however, a sarcastic remark of Demosthenes may indicate that he noticed Aeschines' endeavour to appropriate the role of the decent citizen.

As frequency analysis revealed, there are numerous further key concepts in the speeches of Aeschines that he used significantly more often than his opponent, including value-terms referring to the thematic categories of courage (and cowardice), education, democracy, and law. A detailed analysis of these categories remains a desideratum.

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Greek authors are abbreviated according to the *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*, see Montanari 2015.

<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</i>
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
<i>C&amp;M</i>	<i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i>
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>The Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
Peek, AG	W. Peek: <i>Attische Grabschriften</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

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